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Civil	  Wars,	  from	  Beginning	  .	  .	  .	  to	  End?†	  	  DAVID	  ARMITAGE	  	   	  FROM	  THE	  ANCIENT	  WORLD	  TO	  OUR	  OWN	  TIMES,	   there	  has	  been	  near-­‐universal	  agreement	  on	  two	  features	  of	  civil	  wars:	  that	  of	  all	  wars,	  they	  are	  the	  worst,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  so	  terrible	  because	   they	   seem	   interminable.	   Civil	   strife	  may	  not	  be	   an	   eternal	   fact	   of	  life—“the	  primary	  form	  of	  all	  collective	  conflict”—as	  some	  have	  claimed.1	  However,	  for	   two	   thousand	   years,	   commentators	   have	   found	   civil	   war	   to	   be	   the	   most	  wrenching	  form	  of	  war,	  not	  least	  because	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  most	  difficult	  to	  end.	  The	  primal	  Roman	  poet	  of	  civil	  war,	  Lucan,	  wrote	  in	  the	  opening	  lines	  of	  his	  Bellum	  
civile	  (60–65	  C.E.),	  “no	  foreign	  sword	  has	  ever	  penetrated	  /	  so:	  it	  is	  wounds	  inflicted	  by	   the	  hand	  of	   fellow-­‐citizens	   that	  have	  sunk	  deep”;	   later	   in	  his	  poem,	  a	  bereaved	  parent	   laments:	   “These	   sufferings	   await,	   again	   to	   be	   endured,	   this	   will	   be	   the	  sequence	   /	   of	   the	  warfare,	   this	  will	   be	   the	   outcome	   fixed	   for	   civil	   strife.”2	  Almost	  four	  centuries	  later,	  Augustine	  narrated	  Rome’s	  history	  in	  his	  City	  of	  God	  (413–426	  C.E.)	  as	  a	  series	  of	  civil	  wars	  that	  were	  “more	  bitter	  than	  all	  [Rome’s]	  foreign	  wars,”	  in	  which	  “a	  chain	  of	  causes	  linked	  one	  crime	  with	  another.”3	  Fast-­‐forward	  to	  the	  late	  twentieth	   century,	   and	   we	   find	   former	   French	   president	   Charles	   de	   Gaulle	  expressing	  similar	  sentiments	  on	  a	  trip	  to	  Spain	  in	  1970:	  “All	  wars	  are	  bad,	  because	  they	   symbolize	   the	  breakdown	  of	   politics	   itself.	   But	   civil	  wars,	   in	  which	   there	   are	  brothers	  in	  both	  trenches,	  are	  unforgivable,	  because	  peace	  is	  not	  born	  when	  the	  war	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  Forthcoming,	  American	  Historical	  Review,	  120,	  no.	  5	  (December	  2015). 1	  Hans	  Magnus	  Enzensberger,	  Civil	  Wars:	  From	  L.A.	  to	  Bosnia,	  trans.	  Piers	  Spence	  and	  Martin	   Chalmers	   (New	   York,	   1994;	   original	   German	   ed.	   1993),	   quote	   from	   11;	  	  Russell	   Jacoby,	  Bloodlust:	  On	  the	  Roots	  of	  Violence	  from	  Cain	  and	  Abel	  to	  the	  Present	  (New	  York,	  2011).	  2	  Lucan,	  Bellum	   civile	   (I,	   31–32;	   II,	   223–224),	   in	   Lucan,	   Civil	  War,	   trans.	   Susan	   H.	  Braund	  (Oxford,	  1992),	  3–4,	  27.	  3 	  Augustine,	   The	   City	   of	   God	   against	   the	   Pagans,	   ed.	   and	   trans.	   R.	   W.	   Dyson	  (Cambridge,	  1998),	  138	  (II.	  30).	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concludes.”4	  Because	   civil	   wars	   are	   so	   peculiarly	   agonizing	   and	   leave	   such	   deep	  scars	   on	   historical	  memory,	   they	   appear	   to	   be	   almost	   as	   hard	   to	   end	   as	   they	   are	  awful	  to	  endure.	  “If	  war	  is	  hell,”	  the	  historian	  Arno	  Mayer	  proposed	  in	  2000,	  with	  a	  nod	   to	  William	   Tecumseh	   Sherman,	   “then	   civil	   war	   belongs	   to	   hell’s	   deepest	   and	  most	  infernal	  regions.”5	  	   Ending	  civil	  war	  is	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  each	  of	  the	  essays	  in	  this	  timely	  AHR	  Roundtable,	   published	   to	   coincide	   with	   the	   sesquicentennial	   of	   the	   formal	  conclusion	  of	   the	  U.S.	  Civil	  War	   in	  1865.	  They	  span	   the	  whole	  history	  of	   civil	  war,	  from	   ancient	   Rome	   to	   the	   present,	   and	   over	   every	   inhabited	   continent,	   from	   the	  Americas	   and	  Africa	   to	   Europe	   and	  Asia.	   They	   examine	   the	   varied	   conditions	   and	  methods	   for	   concluding	   civil	   wars,	   from	   military	   victory	   and	   constitutional	  settlement	   to	   amnesties,	   peace	   agreements,	   and	   international	   treaties.	   They	   also	  movingly	  describe	  the	  anguished	  aftermaths	  of	  civil	  war:	  among	  them,	  burying	  the	  dead,	   physical	   reconstruction,	   the	   dislocation	   of	   refugees,	   and	   the	   traumas	   of	  memory.	  Each	  engages	  with	  the	  rich	  historiography	  on	  specific	  civil	  wars	  and	  many	  draw	   upon	   the	  work	   of	   contemporary	   political	   scientists	  who	   have	   analyzed	   civil	  war	  termination	  synoptically	  and	  synthetically.6	  Taken	  together,	  they	  	  constitute	  the	  most	   extensive	   comparative	   treatment	   of	   civil	   war—and	   not	   just	   of	   ending	   civil	  war—ever	  assembled.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Quoted	   in	   Gregorio	   Marañon	   Moya,	   “El	   general	   De	   Gaulle,	   en	   Toledo,”	   El	   País,	  August	   8,	   1981,	   8:	   “Todas	   las	   guerras	   son	  malas,	   porque	   simbolizan	   el	   fracaso	   de	  toda	  política.	  Pero	  las	  guerras	  civiles,	  en	  las	  que	  en	  ambas	  trincheras	  hay	  hermanos,	  son	  imperdonables,	  porque	  la	  paz	  no	  nace	  cuando	  la	  guerra	  termina.”	  5	  Arno	  J.	  Mayer,	  The	  Furies:	  Violence	  and	  Terror	  in	  the	  French	  and	  Russian	  Revolutions	  (Princeton,	  N.J.,	  2000),	  323.	  6	  Roy	   Licklider,	   ed.,	   Stopping	   the	   Killing:	   How	   Civil	   Wars	   End	   (New	   York,	   1995);	  Charles	   King,	   Ending	   Civil	   Wars,	   Adelphi	   Paper	   308	   (Oxford,	   1997);	   Barbara	   F.	  Walter,	  Committing	  to	  Peace:	  The	  Successful	  Settlement	  of	  Civil	  Wars	  (Princeton,	  N.J.,	  2002);	  Monica	  Duffy	  Toft,	  Securing	  the	  Peace:	  The	  Durable	  Settlement	  of	  Civil	  Wars	  (Princeton,	   N.J.,	   2010).	   For	   a	   succinct	   recent	   survey	   of	   this	   literature,	   see	   Joakim	  Kreutz,	  “How	  Civil	  Wars	  End	  (and	  Recur),”	   in	  Edward	  Newman	  and	  Karl	  DeRouen,	  Jr.,	  eds.,	  Routledge	  Handbook	  of	  Civil	  Wars	  (London,	  2014),	  349–362.	  7	  For	  similar	  compilations	  on	  civil	  war,	  though	  mostly	  with	  less	  temporal	  depth	  and	  spatial	   scope,	   see	   Jean-­‐Clément	   Martin,	   ed.,	   La	   guerre	   civile:	   Entre	   histoire	   et	  
mémoire	   (Nantes,	  1994);	  Gabriele	  Ranzato,	   ed.,	  Guerre	  fratricide:	  Le	  guerre	  civili	   in	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   Three	   features	  mark	   this	   roundtable	   as	   unique:	   its	   scope,	   its	   comparisons,	  and	  its	  lessons	  The	  first	  is	  simply	  the	  range	  of	  historical	  examples	  covered	  here.	  For	  the	   most	   part,	   serial	   analysis	   of	   war	   termination	   in	   general,	   and	   of	   civil	   war	  termination	   in	   particular,	   has	   been	   conducted	   on	   a	   relatively	   narrow	   timescale	   of	  two	  centuries	  at	  most.	  Social	  scientists	  who	  study	  civil	  war	  have	  generally	  relied	  on	  large	   	   collections	   of	   data	   	   such	   as	   the	   Uppsala	   Conflict	   Data	   Program’s	   Armed	  Conflict	   Dataset,	   which	   begins	   in	   1946,	   or	   the	   Correlates	   of	   War	   Project	   at	   the	  University	   of	   Michigan,	   whose	   baseline	   is	   1816.8	  Yet	   any	   truly	   historical	   study	   of	  civil	  war—its	   genealogy,	   its	  morphology,	   its	   durability,	   or	   its	   terminability—must	  stretch	  ten	  times	  further	  than	  the	  horizon	  of	  these	  analyses.	  As	  Josiah	  Osgood	  notes,	  the	  Romans	  invented	  the	  term	  “civil	  war”	  (bellum	  civile)	  in	  the	  	  first	  century	  B.C.E.9	  At	  least	   within	   the	  Western	   tradition,	   the	   Romans	   also	   have	   a	   strong	   claim	   to	   have	  invented	   civil	  war	   itself,	   as	   a	   phenomenon	   distinct	   from	   tumult,	   sedition,	   and	   the	  other	  less	  formalized	  episodes	  of	  internal	  violence	  the	  Greeks	  had	  called	  stasis.10	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  instances	  gathered	  here	  are	  salutary	  in	  treating	  civil	  wars	  and	  their	  termination	  over	  a	   longue	  durée	  of	   twenty-­‐two	  centuries,	   from	  their	  beginnings	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
età	   contemporanea	   (Turin,	   1994);	   Peter	  Waldmann	   and	   Fernando	   	   Reinares,	   eds.,	  
Sociedades	   en	   guerra	   civil:	   Conflictos	   violentos	   de	   Europa	   y	   América	   Latina	  (Barcelona,	  1999);	   Jordi	  Canal,	   ed.,	  Las	  guerras	  civiles	  en	  la	  España	  contemporánea	  (Madrid,	   2004);	   Sabina	   Ferhadbegović	   and	   Brigitte	   Weiffen,	   eds.,	   Bürgerkriege	  
erzählen:	  Zum	  Verlauf	  unziviler	  Konflikte	  (Konstanz,	  2011);	  Jordi	  Canal	  and	  Eduardo	  González	  Calleja,	  eds.,	  Guerras	  civiles:	  Una	  clave	  para	  entender	  la	  Europa	  de	  los	  siglos	  
XIX	   y	  XX	   (Madrid,	   2012).	   For	   other	   comparative	   studies	   on	   narrower	   time	   scales,	  see,	   for	   example,	   Philip	   B.	   Minehan,	   Civil	   War	   and	   World	   War	   in	   Europe:	   Spain,	  
Yugoslavia,	  and	  Greece,	  1936–1949	  (New	  York,	  2006);	  Stanley	  G.	  Payne,	  Civil	  War	  in	  
Europe,	  1905–1949	  (Cambridge,	  2011).	  8 	  UCDP/PRIO	   Armed	   Conflict	   Dataset,	   Uppsala	   Conflict	   Data	   Program,	  http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/;	  Meredith	  Reid	  Sarkees	   and	  Frank	  Whelon	  Wayman,	   Resort	   to	  War:	   A	   Data	   Guide	   to	   Inter-­‐State,	   Extra-­‐State,	   Intra-­‐State,	   and	  
Non-­‐State	  Wars,	  1816–2007	  (Washington,	  D.C.,	  2010).	  	  9	  Josiah	  Osgood,	  “Ending	  Civil	  War	  at	  Rome:	  Rhetoric	  and	  Reality,	  88	  B.C.E.–197	  C.E.,”	  	  this	   issue;	   see	   also	   	   Osgood,	   Caesar’s	   Legacy:	   Civil	  War	   and	   the	   Emergence	   of	   the	  
Roman	  Empire	  (Cambridge,	  2006).	  10	  David	  Armitage,	  Civil	  War:	  A	  History	  in	  Ideas	  (New	  York,	  2016),	  chap.	  1,	  “Inventing	  Civil	   War:	   The	   Roman	   Tradition.”	   Giorgio	   Agamben,	   Stasis:	   La	   guerra	   civile	   come	  
paradigma	  politico	  (Turin,	  2015),	  and	  Ninon	  Grangé,	  Oublier	  la	  guerre	  civile?	  Stasis,	  
chronique	  d’une	  disparition	  (Paris,	  2015),	  offer	  an	  opposing	  view.	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republican	  Rome	  to	  future	  prospects	  in	  South	  Asia,	  unlike	  conventional	  studies	  that	  have	  dealt	  solely	  with	  intrastate	  conflicts	  since	  the	  Second	  World	  War.11	  	   Greater	   temporal	   depth	   allows	   for	   more	   enlightening	   comparisons	   among	  civil	  wars	  and	  their	  endings:	   the	  second	   impressive	  quality	  of	   this	  roundtable	  as	  a	  whole.	   The	   obvious	   analogy	   here	   is	   with	   the	   history	   of	   revolutions—those	   other	  transformative,	   often	   violent,	   political	   processes	   that	   have	   appeared	   sequentially	  across	   time	   and	   up	   to	   the	   present.12	  Historians	   have	   generally	   preferred	   to	   study	  civil	  wars,	  like	  revolutions,	  individually	  and	  have	  left	  the	  cumulative	  analysis	  of	  both	  civil	  wars	  and	  revolutions	  to	  social	  scientists.	  Our	  tendency	   is	   toward	  profligacy—the	   reconstruction	   of	   contextual	   specificity	   through	   the	   interpretation	   of	   often	  intractable	  original	  sources—while	  our	  colleagues	  in	  adjacent	  social	  sciences	  prefer	  parsimony:	   “the	   reduction	   of	   potentially	   incommensurate	   phenomena	   to	   uniform	  categories,”	   as	   David	   A.	   Bell	   has	   recently	   described	   their	   procedure	   for	   analyzing	  revolutions.13	  This	  division	  of	  labor	  has	  generated	  multiple	  historical	  case	  studies	  of	  particular	  civil	  wars;	  it	  has	  also	  served	  to	  reaffirm	  a	  methodological	  nationalism	  in	  their	   study	   that	   historians	   have	   begun	   to	   repudiate	   in	   favor	   of	   international,	  transnational,	   and	   global	   approaches	   to	   their	   subjects.	   The	   cumulative	   and	  collaborative	   approach	   adopted	   here	   may	   help	   to	   encourage	   more	   comparative	  consideration	  of	  civil	  wars,	  transnationally	  and	  transtemporally.	  	   The	  roundtable	  consists	  mostly	  of	  treatments	  of	  specific	  national	  instances	  of	  civil	  war—among	  them	  Roman,	  French,	  English,	  Chinese,	  Syrian,	  American,	  Spanish,	  El	  Salvadorean,	  Liberian,	  and	  Afghan.	  Their	   juxtaposition	   	   shows	   that	  comparative	  examination	   of	   civil	   wars	   can	   adopt	   the	   serialism	   of	   the	   social	   sciences	   without	  losing	  the	  contextualism	  prized	  by	  historians.	  Unlike	  the	  study	  of	  revolutions,	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  For	  example,	  Stephen	  John	  Stedman,	  Donald	  Rothchild,	  and	  Elizabeth	  M.	  Cousens,	  eds.,	   Ending	   Civil	   Wars:	   The	   Implementation	   of	   Peace	   Agreements	   (Boulder,	   Colo.,	  2002);	   Matthew	   Preston,	   Ending	   Civil	   War:	   Rhodesia	   and	   Lebanon	   in	   Perspective	  (London,	   2004);	   Shanna	  Kirschner,	  Trust	  and	  Fear	   in	  Civil	  Wars:	  Ending	   Intrastate	  
Conflict	  (Lanham,	  Md.,	  2015).	  12	  David	  Armitage,	   “Every	  Great	  Revolution	   Is	  a	  Civil	  War,”	   in	  Keith	  Michael	  Baker	  and	   Dan	   Edelstein,	   eds.,	   Scripting	   Revolution:	   A	   Historical	   Approach	   to	   the	  
Comparative	  Study	  of	  Revolutions	  (Palo	  Alto,	  	  Calif.,	  2015),	  57–68.	  13	  David	  A.	  Bell,	  “Afterword,”	  	  ibid.,	  345–353,	  here	  347.	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has	  a	  long	  pedigree	  stretching	  from	  the	  mid-­‐seventeenth	  century	  to	  the	  present,	  the	  transtemporal	   and	   transnational	   comparison	  of	   civil	  wars	   is	   still	   in	   its	   infancy.	  By	  exemplifying	  what	  Tobie	  Meyer-­‐Fong	  here	  calls	  “the	  plausibility	  and	  desirability	  of	  dialogue	   among	   historians	   working	   in	   different	   geographical	   areas	   and	   time	  periods”	  on	  civil	  war,	  this	  roundtable	  marks	  a	  promising	  start	  to	  an	  ambitious	  area	  of	  historical	   inquiry.14	  By	  encouraging	  comparisons	  across	  space	  and	  time,	  such	  an	  effort	  can	  provide	  more	  robust	  answers	  to	  the	  problems	  long	  posed	  by	  civil	  war	  in	  the	  past,	  as	  well	  as	  better	  questions	  for	  understanding	  how	  to	  end	  it	  in	  the	  future.	  	   Comparative	  history	  shows	  that	  what	  might	  be	  learned	  from	  many	  civil	  wars	  is	   proportionately	   greater	   than	   the	   lessons	   to	   be	   drawn	   from	   any	   particular	  instance:	  the	  roundtable’s	  third	  main	  collective	  contribution.15	  By	  offering	  multiple	  examples	  of	  civil	  war,	  taken	  from	  widely	  differing	  times	  and	  places,	  under	  a	  broad	  range	   of	   political	   regimes	   (premodern	   and	   modern,	   monarchical	   and	   republican,	  imperial	   and	   statist,	   absolutist	   and	   democratic),	   and	   with	   a	   great	   variety	   of	  outcomes,	   the	   	   essays	  here	  provide	  a	   spectrum	  of	   the	  possibilities	   for	  ending	  civil	  war,	  from	  “giving	  war	  a	  chance”	  (the	  method	  of	  military	  victory)	  through	  to	  various	  forms	   of	   negotiated	   settlement,	   power-­‐sharing,	   and	   internationally	   enforced	  agreements.16	  The	  Romans	  experimented	  variously	  with	  dictatorship,	  proscription,	  spectacle	   (in	   the	   form	   of	   triumphs),	   the	  manipulation	   of	   memory,	   and	   ultimately	  dynasticism	  as	  successive,	   if	  not	  always	  successful,	  prophylactics	  against	   the	  curse	  of	   civil	   war,	   and	  many	   of	   their	   remedies	   were	   imitated	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   later	   civil	  wars.	   For	   example,	   Allan	   Tulchin	   suggests	   that	   absolute	   monarchy	   “inhibited	  compromise”	   during	   the	   French	  Wars	   of	   Religion,	   but	   that	   its	   capacities—notably	  shows	   of	   force,	   the	  manipulation	   of	  munificence,	   and	   the	   negotiation	   of	   religious	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14 	  Tobie	   Meyer-­‐Fong,	   “Where	   the	   War	   Ended:	   Violence,	   Community,	   and	  Commemoration	  in	  China’s	  	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  Civil	  War,”	  	  this	  issue.	  15	  Though	  for	  a	  salutary	  caution	  about	  comparison,	  see	  Stathis	  N.	  Kalyvas,	  “How	  not	  to	   Compare	   Civil	   Wars:	   Greece	   and	   Spain,”	   in	   Martin	   Baumeister	   and	   Stefanie	  Schüler-­‐Springorum,	  eds.,	  “If	  You	  Tolerate	  This	  …”:	  The	  Spanish	  Civil	  War	  in	  the	  Age	  
of	  Total	  War	  (Frankfurt,	  2008),	  247–263.	  16	  Edward	  N.	   Luttwak,	   “Give	  War	   a	  Chance,”	  Foreign	  Affairs	   78,	   no.	   4	   (July/August	  1999):	   36–44;	  Monica	   Duffy	   Toft,	   “Ending	   Civil	  Wars:	   A	   Case	   for	   Rebel	   Victory?,”	  
International	  Security	  34,	  no.	  4	  (Spring	  2010):	  7–36.	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tolerance—ultimately	   helped	   to	   bring	   decades	   of	   conflict	   to	   a	   close. 17 	  The	  restoration	   of	   monarchy	   in	   England	   after	   1660,	   when	   joined	   with	   confessional	  compromise,	   likewise	  brought	  peace,	  Matthew	  Neufeld	  argues,	  but	  only	   in	   tandem	  with	   the	   amnesia	   of	   an	   Act	   of	   Pardon,	   Indemnity	   and	   Oblivion	   (1660),	   a	   strategy	  whose	   origins	   go	   back	   to	   Athens	   in	   the	   	   fifth	   century	   B.C.E.18	  By	   contrast,	   the	  reassertion	  of	  dynasticism,	  along	  with	  documentary	  destruction	  and	  “physical	  and	  ideological	   reconstruction,”	   lent	   only	   temporary	   closure	   after	   the	   Taiping	  War,	   as	  Meyer-­‐Fong	   shows.19	  Like	  other	  mid-­‐nineteenth-­‐century	   conflicts,	   in	   Syria	   and	   the	  United	  States,	   that	  civil	  war	   left	  much	  unfinished	  business	  and	   lingering	  questions	  after	   its	   formal	   termination—what	   one	   Spanish	   historian	   has	   called	   in	   a	   later	  context	  a	  “long	  uncivil	  peace”	  (larga	  paz	  incivil).20	  	   Such	   indeterminacy	   foreshadowed	   the	   twentieth-­‐century	   traumas	   of	   civil	  war.	  For	  example,	  Sandie	  Holguín	  shows	  that	  in	  Spain	  the	  Francisco	  Franco	  regime	  deliberately	   “prolonged	   its	   civil	   war”	   to	   maintain	   power	   until	   1975;	   this	   was	  followed	  after	  Franco’s	  death	  by	  a	  deliberate	  “Pact	  of	  Forgetting”	  (Pacto	  de	  Olvido)	  among	  Spanish	  politicians	  of	  all	  stripes.21	  Clean	  closure	  also	  eluded	  peacemakers	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  and	  will	  likely	  	  not	  come	  for	  Afghanistan.	  Competing	  narratives	  of	   civil	   war—whether	   as	   “liberation	   wars”	   or	   “criminal	   wars”—have	   determined	  colliding	   remedies	   for	   conflict	   in	   the	   one,	   according	   to	   William	   Reno,	   while	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Allan	  A.	  Tulchin,	  “Ending	  the	  French	  Wars	  of	  Religion,”	  	  this	  issue.	  18	  Matthew	  Neufeld,	  “From	  Peacemaking	  to	  Peacebuilding:	  The	  Multiple	  Endings	  of	  England’s	   Long	   Civil	  Wars,”	   	   this	   issue;	   Neufeld,	  The	  Civil	  Wars	   after	   1660:	   Public	  
Remembering	  in	  Late	  Stuart	  England	  (Woodbridge,	  2013).	  On	  the	  Athenian	  amnesty,	  see,	   for	   example,	   Nicole	   Loraux,	   The	   Divided	   City:	   On	   Memory	   and	   Forgetting	   in	  
Ancient	  Athens,	  trans.	  Corinne	  Pache	  	  with	  Jeff	  Fort	  (New	  York,	  2002;	  original	  French	  ed.	   1997);	   Andrew	   Wolpert,	   Remembering	   Defeat:	   Civil	   War	   and	   Civic	   Memory	   in	  
Ancient	  Athens	  (Baltimore,	  2002).	  19	  Meyer-­‐Fong,	  “Where	  the	  War	  Ended.”	  	  See	  also	  Tobie	  Meyer-­‐Fong,	  What	  Remains:	  
Coming	  to	  Terms	  with	  Civil	  War	  in	  19th	  Century	  China	  (Stanford,	  Calif.,	  2013).	  20 	  Julián	   Casanova,	   “Presentación,”	   in	   Casanova	   (coord.),	   Francisco	   Espinosa	  Maestre,	   Conxita	   	   Mir,	   and	   Francisco	   Moreno	   Gómez,	   Morir,	   matar,	   sobrevir:	   La	  
violencia	  en	  la	  dictadura	  de	  Franco	  (Barcelona,	  2002),	  ix–xi,	  here	  x,	  quoted	  in	  Sandie	  Holguín,	  “How	  Did	  the	  Spanish	  Civil	  War	  End?	  	  .	  .	  .	  Not	  So	  Well,”	  	  this	  issue.	  21	  Holguín,	   “How	   Did	   the	   Spanish	   Civil	   War	   End?”;	   Paloma	   Aguilar,	  Memory	   and	  
Amnesia:	   The	   Role	   of	   the	   Spanish	   Civil	  War	   in	   the	   Transition	   to	   Democracy,	   trans.	  Mark	  Oakley	  (New	  York,	  2002;	  original	  Spanish	  ed.	  1996).	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unintended	  consequences	  of	  outside	  intervention	  will	  continue	  to	  affect	  the	  other,	  if	  Abdulkader	  Sinno	  is	  correct.22	  Reno’s	  illuminating	  emphasis	  on	  narrative	  highlights	  the	  ways	   in	  which	   scholarship	   itself	   can	  now	   influence	  how	  civil	  war	  ends,	   as	   the	  literature	   on,	   for	   example,	   “greed	   and	   grievance”	   in	   causing	   civil	   war	   generates	  narratives	   	   that	   shape	   the	   responses	   of	   human	   rights	   groups,	   tribunals,	   and	  international	  organs	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank.23	  These	  narratives	  can	  also	  inspire	  or	  deter	  outside	  intervention	  into	  existing	  conflicts.	  Historical	  examples	  do	  not	  always	  point	   in	   a	   single	   direction:	   in	   this	   sense,	   Sinno	   is	   surely	   right	   to	   conclude	   his	  examination	   of	   intervention	   in	   Afghanistan	   with	   a	   caution	   that	   “the	   lessons	   of	  history	   need	   not	   be	   deterministic.”24	  The	   more	   lessons	   that	   can	   be	   learned,	   the	  greater	  the	  chances	  of	  avoiding	  past	  mistakes	  in	  ending	  future	  civil	  conflicts:	  for,	  as	  Reno	  reminds	  us,	   “Ideas	   turn	  out	   to	  be	  very	   important	   in	  shaping	  how	  a	  civil	  war	  	  ends.”25	  	   Civil	  wars	  can	  feel	  bitterly	  invasive	  to	  those	  who	  go	  through	  them	  because	  of	  their	  divisiveness,	  their	  apparent	  resistance	  to	  regulation,	  their	  tendency	  to	  inspire	  vengeance,	   and	   the	   very	   intimacy	   of	   their	   violence.	   As	   a	   result,	   they	   often	   leave	  lingering	  hostility,	   historical	   trauma,	   and	   fractious	  memory	   in	   their	  wake.	  Most	  of	  the	  essays	  in	  the	  roundtable	  treat	  wars	  that	  dragged	  on,	  flared	  up,	  or	  mutated	  into	  other	   forms	  of	   slow,	  deep	  violence	   long	   after	   any	   formal	   settlement	  or	   surrender.	  Rome’s	  five	  Roman	  civil	  wars	  stretched	  over	  nearly	  three	  hundred	  years.	  The	  eight	  civil	   wars	   that	   later	   came	   to	   be	   called	   the	   French	   “Wars	   of	   Religion”	   lasted	   from	  1562	   to	   1598	   and	   were	   indeed	   ended	   by	   the	   re-­‐imposition	   of	   monarchy.	  Seventeenth-­‐century	  Britain	  suffered	  three	  civil	  wars	  over	  nine	  years	  (1642–1651),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  William	  Reno,	  “Lost	  in	  	  Transitions:	  Civil	  War	  Termination	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,”	  	  this	   issue;	   Abdulkader	   Sinno,	   “Partisan	   Intervention	   and	   the	   Transformation	   of	  Afghanistan’s	  Civil	  War,”	  	  this	  issue.	  23	  See	  especially	  Paul	  Collier	  and	  Anke	  Hoeffler,	  “Greed	  and	  Grievance	  in	  Civil	  War,”	  
Oxford	  Economic	  Papers	  56,	  no.	  4	  (October	  2004):	  563–595.	  24	  Sinno,	  “Partisan	  Intervention	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  Civil	  War.”	  	  25	  Reno,	  “Lost	  in	  	  Transitions.”	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along	  with	   a	   fourth	   that	   never	  was,	   the	   Glorious	   Revolution	   of	   1688–1689.26	  The	  Taiping	  War	   lasted	   thirteen	   years	   (1851–1864)	   and	  was	   the	   nineteenth	   century’s	  bloodiest.	  The	  U.S.	  Civil	  War	  carried	  on	   formally	   for	  only	   four	  years	   (1861–1865),	  but	   by	   some	   accounts	   was	   not	   concluded	   until	   five	   years	   beyond	   Appomattox	   in	  1870,	   as	   Republicans	   declared	   that	   “wartime	   continued”	   through	   Reconstruction,	  anticipating	   the	   increasing	  elasticity	  of	   “wartime”	  more	  generally	   in	   the	   twentieth	  century.27	  The	  civil	  war	  in	  El	  Salvador	  went	  on	  for	  twelve	  years,	  while	  present-­‐day	  Afghanistan	   threatens	   to	   suffer	   fresh	   “conflict	   that	   is	   curiously	   similar	   to	   the	   pre-­‐Coalition	   civil	   war”	   when	   (or	   if)	   the	   U.S.-­‐led	   forces	   in	   the	   country	   finally	   depart.	  These	   experiences	   of	   long	   duration,	   difficult	   termination,	   and	   bitterly	   contested	  memory	  could	  have	  been	  illustrated	  equally	  well	  by	  other	  drawn-­‐out	  civil	  wars,	   in	  Guatemala	   (1960–1996),	   Lebanon	   (1975–1990),	   and	   Sri	   Lanka	   (1983–2009),	   for	  instance.28	  	   Social	   scientists	   who	   study	   civil	   wars	   have	   queried	   whether	   they	   are	  objectively	  harsher,	  more	  destructive,	  or	  more	   lacking	   in	   logic	   than	  other	  kinds	  of	  conflict.29	  In	   the	   process,	   they	   have	   confirmed	   that	   civil	   wars	   seem	   particularly	  agonizing	  because	   they	  do	   last	   longer	   and	  are	  yet	  more	   likely	   to	   recur	   than	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26 	  J.	   G.	   A.	   Pocock,	   “The	   Fourth	   English	   Civil	   War:	   Dissolution,	   Desertion	   and	  Alternative	  Histories	  in	  the	  Glorious	  Revolution,”	  Government	  and	  Opposition	  23,	  no.	  2	  (April	  1988):	  151–166.	  27	  Paul	  A.	  Cimbala	  and	  Randall	  M.	  Miller,	  eds.,	  The	  Great	  Task	  Remaining	  before	  Us:	  
Reconstruction	  as	  America’s	  Continuing	  Civil	  War	  (New	  York,	  2010);	  Mark	  Grimsley,	  “Wars	  for	  the	  American	  South:	  The	  First	  and	  Second	  Reconstructions	  Considered	  as	  Insurgencies,”	  Civil	  War	  History	   58,	   no.	   1	   (March	  2012):	   6–36;	  Elizabeth	  R.	  Varon,	  
Appomattox:	   Victory,	   Defeat,	   and	   Freedom	   at	   the	   End	   of	   the	   Civil	  War	   (New	   York,	  2014);	  Gregory	  P.	  Downs,	  After	  Appomattox:	  Military	  Occupation	  and	  the	  Ends	  of	  War	  (Cambridge,	   Mass.,	   2015).	   On	   the	   broader	   extension	   of	   “wartime,”	   see	   Mary	   L.	  Dudziak,	  War	  Time:	  An	  Idea,	  Its	  History,	  Its	  Consequences	  (New	  York,	  2012).	  28	  Kirsten	  Weld,	  Paper	  Cadavers:	  The	  Archives	  of	  Dictatorship	  in	  Guatemala	  (Durham,	  N.C.,	  2014);	  Robert	  Fisk,	  Pity	  the	  Nation:	  Lebanon	  at	  War	  (London,	  1990);	  Samanth	  Subramanian,	   This	   Divided	   Island:	   Stories	   from	   the	   Sri	   Lankan	   Civil	  War	   (London,	  2015).	  29	  Stathis	  N.	  Kalyvas,	  The	  Logic	  of	  Violence	  in	  Civil	  War	  (Cambridge,	  2006);	  Stathis	  N.	  Kalyvas,	   Ian	   Shapiro,	   and	   Tarek	   Masoud,	   eds.,	   Order,	   Conflict,	   and	   Violence	  (Cambridge,	  2008).	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wars.	  It	  now	  appears	  that	  “the	  most	  likely	  legacy	  of	  a	  civil	  war	  is	  further	  civil	  war.”30	  In	   our	   own	   century,	   most	   of	   these	   apparently	   “neverending	   wars”	   have	   been	  resumptions	   of	   earlier	   civil	   wars. 31 	  These	   recent	   discoveries	   about	   civil	   war	  recurrence	   are	   re-­‐discoveries	   of	   what	   observers	   have	   known	   for	   centuries,	   even	  millennia,	   about	   civil	   war:	   its	   endlessness	   and	   its	   endurance.	   The	   Romans	   had	  learned	   that	   civil	   wars	   were	   like	   volcanoes:	   both	   destructive	   and	   dormant,	  shatteringly	  violent	  and	  yet	  disturbing	  when	  quiescent	  because	  they	  were	  likely	  to	  erupt	   again	   at	   any	   time.32	  To	   stir	   the	   suppressed	  memory	   of	   civil	  war	  was,	   in	   the	  chilling	  words	  of	   the	  poet	  Horace,	   to	   “tread	  on	   fire	   /	   smouldering	  under	   ashes.”33	  
Pace	   the	  orator	  and	  historian	  Titus	  Labienus,	   forgetting	   (oblivio)	  was	  not	   the	  best	  defense	  against	  civil	  war,	  although,	  as	  Osgood	  remarks,	  half-­‐forgetting	  it	  may	  have	  been.34	  That	  was	  hardly	  an	  option	   for	  Rome’s	  heirs	   in	   the	  Latin	  West	  and	  beyond.	  Until	  well	   into	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   Roman	   conceptions	   shaped	   perceptions	   of	  civil	  war	  in	  the	  Western	  world	  and	  its	  imperial	  offshoots,	  though	  they	  were	  overlaid	  with	   multiple	   historical	   memories	   and	   intersected	   with	   other	   conceptions	   of	  internal	   conflict	   in	   Arabic,	   Asian,	   and	   other	   traditions.35	  Roman	   accounts	   of	   serial	  civil	  war—by	  Appian,	  Augustine,	  Caesar,	  Florus,	  Lucan,	  Plutarch,	  and	  Tacitus,	  among	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Paul	  Collier,	  Anke	  Hoeffler,	  and	  Måns	  Söderbom,	  “On	  the	  Duration	  of	  Civil	  War,”	  
Journal	  of	  Peace	  Research	  41,	  no.	  3	  (May	  2004):	  253–273;	  James	  D.	  Fearon,	  “Why	  Do	  Some	   Civil	   Wars	   Last	   So	   Much	   Longer	   Than	   Others?,”	   ibid.,	   275–301;	   Barbara	   F.	  Walter,	   “Does	   Conflict	   Beget	   Conflict?	   Explaining	   Recurring	   Civil	  War,”	   ibid.,	   371–388;	  Paul	  Collier,	  Wars,	  Guns,	  and	  Votes:	  Democracy	  in	  Dangerous	  Places	  (New	  York,	  2009),	  quote	  from	  139.	  	  	  31	  Ann	  Hironaka,	  Neverending	  Wars:	  The	  International	  Community,	  Weak	  States,	  and	  
the	   Perpetuation	   of	   Civil	   War	   (Cambridge,	   Mass.,	   2005);	   The	   World	   Bank,	  World	  
Development	   Report	   2011:	   Conflict,	   Security,	   and	   Development	   (Washington,	   D.C.,	  2011),	  57.	  32	  On	  the	  Roman	  understanding	  of	  civil	  war	  recurrence,	  see	  Brian	  W.	  Breed,	  Cynthia	  Damon,	   and	   Andreola	   Rossi,	   “Introduction,”	   in	   Breed,	   Damon,	   and	   Rossi,	   eds.,	  
Citizens	  of	  Discord:	  Rome	  and	  Its	  Civil	  Wars	  (Oxford,	  2010),	  3–22,	  here	  10–12.	  33	  Horace,	   Odes	   2.1,	   in	   Horace,	   The	   Complete	   Odes	   and	   Epodes,	   trans.	   David	   West	  (Oxford,	  1997),	  56.	  34	  “Optima	  civilis	  belli	  defensio	  oblivio	  est”:	  Seneca,	  Controversiae	  	  10.3.5,	  quoted	  in	  Alain	  M.	  Gowing,	  Empire	  and	  Memory:	  The	  Representation	  of	  the	  Roman	  Republic	  in	  
Imperial	  Culture	  (Cambridge,	  2005),	  82;	  Osgood,	  “Ending	  Civil	  War	  at	  Rome.”	  	  35	  Armitage,	  Civil	  War.	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others—gave	   evidence	   that	   the	   remedies	   for	   civil	   war	   could	   be	   double-­‐edged	   in	  their	   effects.	   The	   imposition,	   or	   re-­‐imposition,	   of	   monarchy	   might	   in	   some	  circumstances	   be	   a	   cure,	   but	   struggles	   over	   the	   succession	   could	   equally	   likely	  engulf	   “the	  world	   in	  blood	  and	  ashes,”	  as	   the	  anti-­‐monarchical	   republican	  Thomas	  Paine	   charged	   in	   1776. 36 	  History	   supplied	   cumulative	   repertoires	   for	   their	  conclusion	  as	  well	  as	  warnings	  about	  their	  potential	  interminability,	  but	  ultimately	  every	  civil	  war	  thus	  had	  to	  find	  its	  own	  ending.	  	   How	  civil	  wars	  end	  is	  intimately	  linked	  to	  how	  they	  begin	  and	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	   they	  are	   fought.	  As	  Ussama	  Makdisi	   shows,	   the	  1860	  civil	  war	   in	   the	  empire	  paralleled	  near-­‐contemporaneous	  events	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  presenting	  in	   each	   case	   the	   “quintessentially	   nineteenth-­‐century	   problem	   of	   shifting	   from	   a	  system	   of	   overt	   discrimination	   to	   one	   that	   emphasized	   non-­‐discrimination	   and	  notionally	  equal	  citizenship”.37	  In	  the	  two	  cases,	  that	  transformation	  was	  framed	  in	  different	   but	   not,	  Makdisi	   suggests,	   incommensurable	   terms:	   religious	   in	  Ottoman	  Syria,	  racial	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  outcomes	  were	  also	  distinct:	  Union	  victory	   in	   North	   America	   cemented	   sovereign	   territoriality	   along	   with	   the	  reassertion	  of	  racial	  dominance;	  Ottoman	  authority	  over	  a	  pacified	  Syria	  was	  diluted	  in	  Mount	  Lebanon	  by	  religious	  “coexistence	  in	  a	  diminished	  Ottoman	  sovereignty.”38	  By	  contrast,	   the	  pacification	  of	   the	  American	  South	  extended	   the	  war	  well	  beyond	  the	  moment	   of	   formal	   surrender,	   though	   it	   was	   not	   accompanied	   by	   trials	   of	   the	  defeated	   or	   reprisals	   against	   them.	   This	  was	   a	   tempered	   use	   of	   force	   designed	   to	  snuff	  out	  once	  and	  for	  all	  the	  avant-­‐garde	  nationalist	  aspirations	  of	  southerners	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Thomas	  Paine,	  Common	  Sense	  (1776),	   in	  Paine,	  Collected	  Writings,	  ed.	  Eric	  Foner	  (New	  York,	  1995),	  5–59,	  here	  19.	  	  37	  Ussama	  Makdisi,	   “Diminished	  Sovereignty	  and	   the	   Impossibility	  of	   ‘Civil	  War’	   in	  the	   Modern	   Middle	   East.”	   See	   also	   Leila	   Tarazi	   Fawaz,	   An	  Occasion	   for	  War:	   Civil	  
Conflict	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  Damascus	  in	  1860	   (Berkeley,	  Calif.,	  1994);	  Ussama	  Makdisi,	  
The	  Culture	  of	  Sectarianism:	  Community,	  History,	  and	  Violence	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  
Ottoman	  Lebanon	  (Berkeley,	  Calif.,	  2000).	  38	  Makdisi,	   “Diminished	   Sovereignty	   and	   the	   Impossibility	   of	   ‘Civil	   War’	   in	   the	  Modern	  Middle	  East.”	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self-­‐determination. 39 	  As	   William	   Blair	   argues,	   the	   use	   of	   force	   retarded	  reconciliation,	   while	   	   “questions	   concerning	   citizenship	   and	   rights”	   for	   African	  Americans	   remained	   unresolved	   for	   almost	   a	   century.40	  This	  was	   hardly	  what	   the	  reformist	  French	  politician	  Agénor	  de	  Gasparin	  envisaged	  in	  1865	  to	  be	  “the	  liberal	  conclusion	  of	  a	  civil	  war.”41	  	   Concluding	   civil	  wars	   became	  paradoxically	  more	   complex	   and	  more	   likely	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  twentieth	  centuries	  as	  they	  came	  increasingly	  to	  be	  matters	  of	  international	  concern.	  From	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Roman	  civil	  wars	  until	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  such	  conflicts	  remained	  mostly	  internal	  or	  domestic	   matters.	   The	   American	   and	   French	   revolutions	   and	   the	   movements	   for	  redistributing	   sovereignty	   and	   authority	   in	   early-­‐nineteenth-­‐century	   southern	  Europe	   and	   Spanish	   America	   brought	   questions	   of	   international	   recognition	   and	  intervention	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  political	  and	  legal	  calculations	  for	  the	  first	  time.42	  In	  the	  following	  two	  centuries,	  during	  the	  Spanish	  Civil	  War	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  Cold	  War,	  outside	  powers	  became	  more	  inclined	  to	  use	  the	  parties	  in	  civil	  wars	  as	  proxies	  or	   to	   attempt	   to	   broker	   peace	   settlements	   through	   international	   institutions.	  Joaquin	   M.	   Chávez	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   civil	   war	   in	   El	   Salvador	   ended	   more	  conclusively	   in	  1992	  not	  only	  because	  the	  contending	  sides	  had	  been	  more	  evenly	  matched,	  but	  because	  international	  actors,	  including	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  had	  a	  greater	  stake	  in	  the	  war’s	  termination.	  This	  may	  not	  have	  been	  enough	  to	  create	  “the	  basis	  for	  a	  more	  peaceful	  and	  just	  society	  in	  El	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  On	  Confederate	  nationalism	  as	  a	  species	  of	  contemporary	  self-­‐determination,	  see	  especially	   Don	   H.	   Doyle,	   The	   Cause	   of	   All	   Nations:	   An	   International	   History	   of	   the	  
American	  Civil	  War	  (New	  York,	  2014),	  27–29.	  40	  Blair,	  “Finding	  the	  Ending	  of	  America’s	  Civil	  War”;	  see	  also	  William	  A.	  Blair,	  With	  
Malice	   toward	   Some:	   Treason	   and	   Loyalty	   in	   the	   Civil	   War	   Era	   (Chapel	   Hill,	   N.C.,	  2014).	  41	  Agénor	  de	  Gasparin	  to	  William	  H.	  Seward,	  May	  1,	  1865,	  quoted	  in	  Blair,	  “Finding	  the	  Ending	  of	  America’s	  Civil	  War.”;	  Doyle,	  The	  Cause	  of	  All	  Nations,	  132–138.	  42	  For	   recent	   histories	   of	   early	   interventionism,	   see	  Gary	   J.	   Bass,	  Freedom’s	  Battle:	  
The	  Origins	  of	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  (New	  York,	  2008);	  Brendan	  Simms	  and	  D.	  J.	   B.	   Trim,	   eds.,	   Humanitarian	   Intervention:	   A	   History	   (Cambridge,	   2011);	   Stefano	  Recchia	  and	  Jennifer	  M.	  Welsh,	  eds.,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Military	  Intervention:	  European	  
Thinkers	  from	  Vitoria	  to	  Mill	  (Cambridge,	  2013).	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Salvador,”	   but	   it	   did	   help	   to	   end	   the	  war	   decisively.43	  The	   likelihood	   of	   civil	  wars	  being	  terminated	  by	  international	  agreements	  will	  surely	  only	  increase,	  even	  as	  the	  dangers	   of	   what	   Reno	   calls	   “direct	   partisan	   intervention”	   in	   civil	   wars	   have	   also	  grown.44	  	   Sometimes	   generations	   must	   pass	   before	   the	   fires	   of	   civil	   war	   can	   be	  extinguished.	   As	   Neufeld	   notes	   in	   the	   conclusion	   to	   his	   essay,	   “in	   the	   case	   of	  seventeenth-­‐century	   England,	   it	   took	   fifty	   years,	   three	   legislative	   settlements,	   one	  revolution,	  and	  one	  foreign	  war	  to	  achieve	  civil	  peace	  once	  and	  for	  all.”45	  Even	  that	  chastening	  summation	  may	  overlook	  the	  aftershocks	  of	  the	  British—rather	  than	  just	  English—civil	  wars,	  in	  Scotland	  (where	  the	  Jacobite	  threat	  lingered	  until	  1745,	  if	  not	  longer)	  and	  especially	  in	  Ireland,	  where,	  as	  Lord	  Macaulay	  wrote	  in	  the	  1840s,	  the	  historian’s	   “steps—to	  borrow	  a	   fine	   image	  used	  on	  a	  similar	  occasion	  by	  a	  Roman	  poet—are	   on	   the	   thin	   crust	   of	   ashes	   beneath	   which	   the	   lava	   is	   still	   glowing.”46	  Similarly,	   the	   historical	   memory	   of	   the	   Taiping	   War	   would	   be	   argued	   over	   well	  beyond	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Qing	   Dynasty	   against	   which	   the	   leaders	   of	   the	   Taiping	  Heavenly	   Kingdom	   Revolutionary	   Movement	   had	   raised	   their	   banners:	   indeed,	   it	  would	   only	   be	   after	   the	   Chinese	   Revolution	   in	   1911	   that	   the	   events	   could	   be	  branded	   as	   a	   civil	   war—rather	   than	   as	   an	   anti-­‐dynastic	   “rebellion”—at	   all.	   This	  parallels	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   contemporary	   conflict	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   which	  official	  documents,	  such	  as	  the	  	  seventy-­‐volume	  official	  history	  of	  the	  U.S.	  “Civil	  War”	  published	  between	  1880	  and	  1891,	  called	  “the	  War	  of	  the	  Rebellion,”	  a	  title	  clearly	  intended	   to	   delegitimate	   the	   cause	   of	   the	   defeated	   Confederate	   “rebels.”47	  Recent	  arguments	  over	  the	  flying	  of	  the	  Confederate	  battle	  flag	  in	  South	  Carolina,	  Alabama,	  and	   Mississippi	   suggest	   that	   even	   150	   years	   later,	   the	   embers	   of	   conflict	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Joaquín	  M.	  Chávez,	  “How	  Did	  the	  Civil	  War	  in	  El	  Salvador	  End?”	  44	  Sinno,	  “Partisan	  Intervention	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  Civil	  War.”	  45	  Neufeld,	  “From	  Peacemaking	  to	  Peacebuilding.”	  46	  Thomas	  Babington	  Macaulay,	  The	  History	  of	  England	  from	  the	  Accession	  of	  James	  
the	  Second,	  4th	  	  ed.,	  6	  vols.	  (London,	  1849),	  	  2:	  125.	  47	  U.S.	   Department	   of	   War,	   The	  War	   of	   the	   Rebellion:	   A	   Compilation	   of	   the	   Official	  
Records	   of	   the	   Union	   and	   Confederate	   Armies,	   70	   vols.	   (Washington,	   D.C.,	   1880–1891).	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United	   States	   have	   not	   entirely	   cooled.48	  Likewise,	   the	   fiercely	   contested	   status	   of	  Yasukuni	   Shrine	   in	   Tokyo	   (originally	   constructed	   in	   1869	   as	   a	   memorial	   to	   the	  imperial	   loyalists	   who	   died	   during	   Japan’s	   Boshin	   War)	   and	   of	   the	   Valle	   de	   los	  Caídos	   in	  Spain	  (a	  monument	  to	   the	  Nationalist	  dead	  of	   the	  Spanish	  Civil	  War	  and	  the	  burial	  place	  of	  Francisco	  Franco)	  keeps	  the	  divisions	  of	  long-­‐terminated	  conflicts	  alive	  into	  the	  present.49	  In	  all	  these	  cases,	  to	  forgive	  civil	  war	  has	  not	  been	  to	  forget	  it.	  	   This	   AHR	   Roundtable	   raises	   as	   many	   questions	   as	   it	   answers	   about	   the	  terminability,	   or	   interminability,	   of	   civil	   war.	   In	   light	   of	   two	   thousand	   years’	  experience	   of	   ceaseless,	   repeated	   civil	   wars,	   its	   theme	   may	   appear	   to	   embody	  something	  of	  a	  question	  mal	  posée.	  Asking	  whether	   civil	  wars	  end	  rather	   than	  how	  they	  end	  might	  better	  capture	  the	  uncertainties	  of	  the	  lingering	  hostility,	  historical	  trauma,	   and	   fractious	   memory	   they	   often	   leave	   in	   their	   wake.	   This	   matters	  especially	  because	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first-­‐century	  world,	  almost	  all	  wars	  are	  now	  “civil”	  wars:	  according	  to	  one	  widely	  cited	  estimate,	  there	  have	  been	  259	  armed	  conflicts	  since	  1945,	  and	  more	  than	  95	  percent	  of	  those	  recorded	  since	  1989	  were	  intra-­‐state,	  not	  inter-­‐state,	  conflicts.	  The	  great	  majority	  of	  those	  became	  “internationalized	  civil	  wars,”	  with	   the	   participation	   of	   near-­‐neighbors	   or	   other	   external	   agents:	   in	   2014,	  thirty-­‐nine	   of	   the	   forty	   active	   conflicts	   globally	   were	   of	   this	   kind,	   in	   Afghanistan,	  Mali,	   Somalia,	   and	   elsewhere. 50 	  As	   one	   analyst	   has	   recently	   noted,	   “There	   is	  uncertainty	  as	   to	  how	  to	  define	  victory	  and	  defeat	   in	   these	  circumstances	  or	  even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48 	  Robert	   E.	   Bonner,	   Colors	   and	   Blood:	   Flag	   Passions	   of	   the	   Confederate	   South	  (Princeton,	  N.J.,	  2002);	  David	  W.	  Blight,	  Race	  and	  Reunion:	  The	  Civil	  War	  in	  American	  
Memory	   (Cambridge,	  Mass.,	  2003);	  David	  W.	  Blight,	  American	  Oracle:	  The	  Civil	  War	  
in	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Era	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.,	  2013).	  49	  Akiko	  Takenaka,	  Yasukuni	  Shrine:	  History,	  Memory,	  and	  Japan’s	  Unending	  Postwar	  (Honolulu,	   2015);	   Tàrio	   Rubio,	   El	   Valle	   de	   los	   Caídos	   y	   la	   represión	   franquista	  (Tarragona,	  2011).	  50	  Therése	  Pettersson	  and	  Peter	  Wallensteen,	  “Armed	  Conflicts,	  1946–2014,”	  Journal	  
of	   Peace	   Research	   	   52,	   no.	   4	   (July	   2015):	   536–550;	   Kristian	   Skrede	   Gleditsch,	  “Transnational	  Dimensions	  of	  Civil	  War,”	   Journal	  of	  Peace	  Research	   44,	  no.	  3	   (May	  2007):	   293–309;	   Jeffrey	   T.	   Checkel,	   ed.,	   Transnational	   Dynamics	   of	   Civil	   War	  (Cambridge,	  2013).	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when	   such	   conflicts	  meaningfully	   begin	   and	   end.”51	  Civil	   wars	   have	   produced	   not	  just	   destruction	   and	   dislocation	   within	   their	   respective	   countries,	   but	   escalating	  numbers	  of	  refugees:	  500,000	  during	  the	  Spanish	  Civil	  War,	  almost	  1	  million	  from	  El	  Salvador	  in	  the	  1980s,	  and	  over	  4	  million	  and	  counting	  from	  Syria	  since	  2012.52	  The	  essays	   in	   this	   roundtable	   demonstrate	   that,	   in	   cases	   of	   civil	   war,	   “committing	   to	  peace”	  might	  not	  be	  a	  straightforward	  means	  of	  “securing	  the	  peace”.	  53	  Civil	  war	  is	  a	  long-­‐lived	   phenomenon.	   Ongoing	   civil	   wars,	   from	   Afghanistan	   to	   Syria,	   seem	  intractable.	   Their	   consequences	   can	   shape	   regions	   and	   histories	   for	   generations.	  Despite	  “the	  better	  angels	  of	  our	  nature,”	  we	  still	  have	  far	  to	  go	  before	  “winning	  the	  war”	  on	  civil	  war.	  54	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